I have updated the Test Ladder through the start of the 2010 Northern Hemisphere season.
Two changes occurred:
Australia rose to the top of the ladder owing to the win over New Zealand in New Zealand. (A drawn or lost series would have seen India pass Australia to claim second place.) England's draw against South Africa weighed too heavily in the face of Australian successes against weaker teams.
New Zealand, despite the loss at home, still managed to accumulate enough points to get past the makeshift West Indies' elevens beaten by Bangladesh (hence the unlikely high placing of the weakest of Test sides) and Australia.
England currently look likely to head into the Ashes series in top spot again, though.
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Australia. Show all posts
Monday, 23 August 2010
Thursday, 15 July 2010
Lord's Collapsed
Way back in 2004, Phil and I devised a method of defining what exactly a collapse in cricket was.
The working definition we came up with was:
A collapse occurs when three or more wickets fall for 60 or fewer runs, with no partnership adding more than 35 runs.
Well, looking at the current test at Lord's we see a lot of collapsing going on.
In their first innings, Australia suffered a collapse when wickets 4 through 9 went for 51.
In their first innings, Pakistan never really stopped collapsing:
Collapse #1 Wickets 1-3 54/3;
Collapse #2 Wickets 3-5 29/3;
Collapse #3 Wickets 5-9 58/5;
Collapse #4 Wickets 7-10 31/4.
And then Australia collapsed again in their second innings: Wickets 2-4, 36/3.
The working definition we came up with was:
A collapse occurs when three or more wickets fall for 60 or fewer runs, with no partnership adding more than 35 runs.
Well, looking at the current test at Lord's we see a lot of collapsing going on.
In their first innings, Australia suffered a collapse when wickets 4 through 9 went for 51.
In their first innings, Pakistan never really stopped collapsing:
Collapse #1 Wickets 1-3 54/3;
Collapse #2 Wickets 3-5 29/3;
Collapse #3 Wickets 5-9 58/5;
Collapse #4 Wickets 7-10 31/4.
And then Australia collapsed again in their second innings: Wickets 2-4, 36/3.
Thursday, 27 August 2009
Ashes Series' Bowlers Rated
Using my 'series score' system, which adjusts bowlers' statistics for the number of runs scored in the series and the consequent effect of this on the value of wickets taken, we get the following ratings:
England's victory was certainly not won by their bowlers. They were, however, more economical than the Australians, and that may be the key to victory. Swann's series score in particular probably understates his value. In the end, however, the series score is based on taking wickets, and on that basis Onions' score over 5 innings may be worth even more than Broad's score over 8. Onions probably is the most underrated bowler in the side. Flintoff's figure might come as a surprise-but he only took 8 wickets for an average of 52.13. Not a very impressive departure from Test cricket.
Hilfenhaus 28
Broad 16
Siddle 16
Johnson 11
Onions 9
Hauritz 6
Harmison 2
Clark - 4
Katich - 4
Clarke - 5
Collingwood - 5
Bopara - 6
Swann - 7
Watson - 7
North - 8
Panesar -11
Anderson -14
Flintoff -17
England's victory was certainly not won by their bowlers. They were, however, more economical than the Australians, and that may be the key to victory. Swann's series score in particular probably understates his value. In the end, however, the series score is based on taking wickets, and on that basis Onions' score over 5 innings may be worth even more than Broad's score over 8. Onions probably is the most underrated bowler in the side. Flintoff's figure might come as a surprise-but he only took 8 wickets for an average of 52.13. Not a very impressive departure from Test cricket.
Saturday, 22 August 2009
Kennington Oval, Ashes 2009, #4
England fans were whooping up a storm as Australian wickets fell before the spin of Swann and the pace of Broad. For once, it appeared, the English brains trust had out-thought the Australians'. Then, of course, one-two-three, wickets fell as England attempted to gain more ground on a strong Australian batting line-up that could be expected to crank out 400 runs.
At close of play last night, England's Win Expectancy stood at something around 32%, which isn't any better than what you'd get at the start of a Test. However, Strauss and Trott batted away the morning session, until Strauss's wicket fell just before lunch.
The Win Expectancy model would surprisingly suggest that England's chances of winning continue to dwindle. Go figure. One problem with my model is that there aren't many examples of a match like this Test.
CricInfo's Hawk-Eye (linked via the scorecard there) sees an 80 per cent chance of an England win. I can't help but think they are underestimating Australia's batsmen.
At close of play last night, England's Win Expectancy stood at something around 32%, which isn't any better than what you'd get at the start of a Test. However, Strauss and Trott batted away the morning session, until Strauss's wicket fell just before lunch.
The Win Expectancy model would surprisingly suggest that England's chances of winning continue to dwindle. Go figure. One problem with my model is that there aren't many examples of a match like this Test.
CricInfo's Hawk-Eye (linked via the scorecard there) sees an 80 per cent chance of an England win. I can't help but think they are underestimating Australia's batsmen.
Thursday, 20 August 2009
Kennington Oval, Ashes 2009, #3
At the end of the first day, this Test match is hard to read in terms of Win Expectancy. If the Australians can put up some good scores in their innings, they will probably win the match. However, England's actual position, at 307/8, is quite a decent chance to convert to a win. Throwing in all the factors - the Australian batting, the effect of the remaining resources for England, and England's current position - the draw remains the most favoured outcome (42 per cent), followed by an Australian victory (35 per cent), with an English victory the least likely (23 per cent).
Let's look at how England batsmen affected their chances:
Flintoff's was the most damaging wicket, which is to my mind somehow fitting given that this is his last Test. To prove the point about how he has been misunderstood by the selectors he should take ten wickets over the two innings, and go for not very many runs. His batting has always been overrated by England, and the persistence in regarding him as an all-rounder has weakened the side.
Australia have reason to be pleased with all their bowlers except Mitchell Johnson, who has been too expensive. Clark and Hilfenhaus may be lagging in taking wickets, but their economies are well-below the kind of number that characterizes a winning test side. Siddle's got the balance about right.
Let's look at how England batsmen affected their chances:
Cook -.034
Strauss +.016
Collingwood -.035
Bell +.062
Prior +.071
Flintoff -.151
Trott +.040
Swann -.013
Flintoff's was the most damaging wicket, which is to my mind somehow fitting given that this is his last Test. To prove the point about how he has been misunderstood by the selectors he should take ten wickets over the two innings, and go for not very many runs. His batting has always been overrated by England, and the persistence in regarding him as an all-rounder has weakened the side.
Australia have reason to be pleased with all their bowlers except Mitchell Johnson, who has been too expensive. Clark and Hilfenhaus may be lagging in taking wickets, but their economies are well-below the kind of number that characterizes a winning test side. Siddle's got the balance about right.
Kennington Oval, Ashes 2009, #2
Two points, at lunch.
On the win expectancy, the Cook wicket reduced England's chances of winning by .055. However, one might be surprised to learn that the stand by Strauss and Bell has had the effect of increasing the chances of a decision, which is helping Australia more than England. Australia's chance of winning is about 41 per cent.
I'm told Michael Holding, commentating on Sky, made a statement along the lines of 'Strauss isn't playing shots which suggests he might not have confidence in his batsmen'. I find statements like that beyond ludicrous. Strauss may have every confidence in his batsmen, but he's not taking risks because he recognizes he's got a chance to wear out the bowlers simply by defending his wicket. Or Holding could be right. But the point is Strauss's actions are open to more than one interpretation, and Holding is assuming Strauss has the same opinion of the England lineup as Holding does. That's not really very helpful or incisive.
On the win expectancy, the Cook wicket reduced England's chances of winning by .055. However, one might be surprised to learn that the stand by Strauss and Bell has had the effect of increasing the chances of a decision, which is helping Australia more than England. Australia's chance of winning is about 41 per cent.
I'm told Michael Holding, commentating on Sky, made a statement along the lines of 'Strauss isn't playing shots which suggests he might not have confidence in his batsmen'. I find statements like that beyond ludicrous. Strauss may have every confidence in his batsmen, but he's not taking risks because he recognizes he's got a chance to wear out the bowlers simply by defending his wicket. Or Holding could be right. But the point is Strauss's actions are open to more than one interpretation, and Holding is assuming Strauss has the same opinion of the England lineup as Holding does. That's not really very helpful or incisive.
Kennington Oval, Ashes 2009 #1
Hmm, I've come late to this, and missed the team news. I think both teams have made a mistake. Today's weather might favour the Australian option to go without a spinner, but over five days at the Oval I'd rather have five bowlers including at least one spinner. The Australian persistence with a four-bowler attack is mystifying me. I don't think this is good for pace bowlers' careers, although I'm still working on proving that.
But that's not as mystifying as England choosing Harmison, again. Onions has bowled at least one good innings in each Test he's played this summer. Harmison hasn't even bowled one good innings in the one Test he's played. It's just a joke, a triumph of media pressure over picking players currently demonstrating good form. I despair of England's selection policy, and have been doing so for seven years now.
But that's not as mystifying as England choosing Harmison, again. Onions has bowled at least one good innings in each Test he's played this summer. Harmison hasn't even bowled one good innings in the one Test he's played. It's just a joke, a triumph of media pressure over picking players currently demonstrating good form. I despair of England's selection policy, and have been doing so for seven years now.
Tuesday, 11 August 2009
Fresh Blood?
Simon Hughes reviews some alternatives for the next Test. Meanwhile, my preference from the aftermath of the Cardiff Test (not so sure now), Jamie Dalrymple, leads the England Lions in a two-day match against Australia at the weekend.
UPDATE, 20 AUG 2009: Dalrymple got 58 off 122 balls in the Lions' match. Why wasn't he picked for the side? Instead we had a lot of fuss about Ramprakash and even the retired Trescothick. I ask you.
UPDATE, 20 AUG 2009: Dalrymple got 58 off 122 balls in the Lions' match. Why wasn't he picked for the side? Instead we had a lot of fuss about Ramprakash and even the retired Trescothick. I ask you.
Sunday, 9 August 2009
Sloppy Playing, Sloppy Thinking
England's cricket team were completely outplayed at the Ashes Fourth Test at Headingley. But this is sports, you learn from your mistakes, put it behind you, and focus on winning the next time. Well, unless you're a panicky England fan.
This is the perfect example of the kind of sloppy, knee-jerk thinking that characterizes the English way of doing things. Go back to that Justin Langer document. Beneath all the Australian arrogance are two key points: 1) England's players like to feel they are making progress; 2) England are psychologically weak. Point two is the kind of 'cod psychology' that gives successful athletes a bad name. I'd almost recommend ignoring that nonsense, except in making that point, this document actually tells us something important.
Let's go back a bit here. England picked an XI at the start of the series that excluded Bell and Harmison. So why are they in the side now? We know the answer to that — injuries. The question is whether they are worth retaining as injury substitutes. Harmison was, apart from Anderson, the most expensive English bowler. That's fine if you take 4-5 wickets, but he took 2. He's been found wanting, and I don't need sabermetric methods to tell me he should be dropped. Bell is a different issue, in that there isn't an obvious alternative. I'd actually stick with him over any inexperienced batsmen, such as Trott.
The real England problem is a sabermetric issue. Basically, the batsmen don't seem to know where their stumps are, and can't seem to accept that they can be making progress in a Test match if they are not giving up their wickets. This isn't ODI or T/20 territory. You can bat all five days and be guaranteed not to lose the match. So it's a simple psychological tweak needed with the batsmen. Instead of them getting fidgety when they are not scoring, they should get fidgety when they are playing shots they don't need to. Also, they should try to reset themselves more often, so they have a clear idea where the stumps are. It doesn't matter what some sledging Ocker, with more lip than brains, has to say about it.
The bowlers have a similar issue. The trouble is in their heads. Yes, short-pitched, aggressive bowling sure looks good, but the reality is that if it's not productive, go for a longer length and if your deliveries are drifting wide, aim a little bit more at leg.
With Langer's (1), the issue is simply to redefine what making progress is.
(2) tells us more about Australia than England. The Australians have a confidence that comes from a tradition of winning, and look down on a side that during the Nasser Hussain years had all the charm of a little kid looking up to the 'Australian way' as the best. Normally, the English can look at these jumped-up transportees with a confidence that comes from greater sophistication. That doesn't quite carry over into the realm of sports (particularly with Nasser), so let's draw on some other good English traditions that have equated to winning. The England side needs to remember the kind of bloody-minded stubbornness that made its soldiers and sailors the best in the world in the eighteenth century and after. 'Throw everything you like at us, mate, we'll be here tomorrow.'
This is the perfect example of the kind of sloppy, knee-jerk thinking that characterizes the English way of doing things. Go back to that Justin Langer document. Beneath all the Australian arrogance are two key points: 1) England's players like to feel they are making progress; 2) England are psychologically weak. Point two is the kind of 'cod psychology' that gives successful athletes a bad name. I'd almost recommend ignoring that nonsense, except in making that point, this document actually tells us something important.
Let's go back a bit here. England picked an XI at the start of the series that excluded Bell and Harmison. So why are they in the side now? We know the answer to that — injuries. The question is whether they are worth retaining as injury substitutes. Harmison was, apart from Anderson, the most expensive English bowler. That's fine if you take 4-5 wickets, but he took 2. He's been found wanting, and I don't need sabermetric methods to tell me he should be dropped. Bell is a different issue, in that there isn't an obvious alternative. I'd actually stick with him over any inexperienced batsmen, such as Trott.
The real England problem is a sabermetric issue. Basically, the batsmen don't seem to know where their stumps are, and can't seem to accept that they can be making progress in a Test match if they are not giving up their wickets. This isn't ODI or T/20 territory. You can bat all five days and be guaranteed not to lose the match. So it's a simple psychological tweak needed with the batsmen. Instead of them getting fidgety when they are not scoring, they should get fidgety when they are playing shots they don't need to. Also, they should try to reset themselves more often, so they have a clear idea where the stumps are. It doesn't matter what some sledging Ocker, with more lip than brains, has to say about it.
The bowlers have a similar issue. The trouble is in their heads. Yes, short-pitched, aggressive bowling sure looks good, but the reality is that if it's not productive, go for a longer length and if your deliveries are drifting wide, aim a little bit more at leg.
With Langer's (1), the issue is simply to redefine what making progress is.
(2) tells us more about Australia than England. The Australians have a confidence that comes from a tradition of winning, and look down on a side that during the Nasser Hussain years had all the charm of a little kid looking up to the 'Australian way' as the best. Normally, the English can look at these jumped-up transportees with a confidence that comes from greater sophistication. That doesn't quite carry over into the realm of sports (particularly with Nasser), so let's draw on some other good English traditions that have equated to winning. The England side needs to remember the kind of bloody-minded stubbornness that made its soldiers and sailors the best in the world in the eighteenth century and after. 'Throw everything you like at us, mate, we'll be here tomorrow.'
Saturday, 8 August 2009
'Oh, Calamity' - Headingley Test 2009
Michael Henderson just about says it all about the Headingley Test, although I haven't actually seen any of the action. I'm told CricInfo had rather over-egged the pudding in describing North's catch off Strauss.
Looking at a rough estimate of Win Expectancy at the end of England's first innings, they had about an 18 per cent chance of winning the Test from that point. Looking at how those wins were achieved, they fall into two categories:
1) Bowling out the other side for even less. ENGLAND FAIL
2) Keeping the other side's score within about 100 runs. ENGLAND FAIL
That leaves us commentators with not much to write about.
I could talk about England selection, and even Australian selection. After the Australian's hinted at something really radical, like using five bowlers, they fell into their default option, merely replacing the spinner with a pace bowler. Meanwhile, England, confronted with Flintoff's injury, were forced to think through all the permutations. One wonders if they thought at any length about sticking Trott in the side and going with four bowlers. I doubt it.
EDIT: Couldn't we make the same complaint about both Flintoff and Harmison? They bowl to too short a length? Food for thought there.
Looking at a rough estimate of Win Expectancy at the end of England's first innings, they had about an 18 per cent chance of winning the Test from that point. Looking at how those wins were achieved, they fall into two categories:
1) Bowling out the other side for even less. ENGLAND FAIL
2) Keeping the other side's score within about 100 runs. ENGLAND FAIL
That leaves us commentators with not much to write about.
I could talk about England selection, and even Australian selection. After the Australian's hinted at something really radical, like using five bowlers, they fell into their default option, merely replacing the spinner with a pace bowler. Meanwhile, England, confronted with Flintoff's injury, were forced to think through all the permutations. One wonders if they thought at any length about sticking Trott in the side and going with four bowlers. I doubt it.
EDIT: Couldn't we make the same complaint about both Flintoff and Harmison? They bowl to too short a length? Food for thought there.
Thursday, 6 August 2009
Edgbaston Win Expectancy Shifts
The Third Test between England and Australia produced, apart from this curiosity, some big shifts in win expectancy. I've pulled out the three biggest positive shifts, in terms of the side batting, and the three biggest negative ones. Reverse the polarity if you want to look at it in terms of bowling.
BIG Plus
Watson-Ponting, 41 runs for the 2nd wicket in AUS1 (+.218)
Watson-Hussey, 85 runs for the 3rd wicket in AUS2 (+.197)
Cook-Bopara, 58 runs for the 2nd wicket in ENG1 (+.171)
BIG Minus
Hussey, 0, in AUS1 (-.287)
Collingwood, 13, in ENG1 (-.188)
Ponting, 5, in AUS2 (-.178)
Honourable mention has to go to Cook, 0, in ENG1, which was worth -.176.
It's worth noting that for wickets or stands to count, they really need to come in pairs. It's no good piling on 100 runs and follow it with a pittance. Nor is taking a top batsman's wicket for a low score worth much if you don't break up the next partnership pretty quickly. You can let the wicket after that go for a bit, though. Anapestic metre, if you're of a poetic mind.
Are you surprised that the massive Clarke-North stand in the Australian second innings didn't appear? Probably not, as it was too late in the match to affect anything other than their averages. It actually did produce a positive effect, but I just wonder if the Australians should have cut it short when it was around a hundred and gone for a win. You never know.
BIG Plus
Watson-Ponting, 41 runs for the 2nd wicket in AUS1 (+.218)
Watson-Hussey, 85 runs for the 3rd wicket in AUS2 (+.197)
Cook-Bopara, 58 runs for the 2nd wicket in ENG1 (+.171)
BIG Minus
Hussey, 0, in AUS1 (-.287)
Collingwood, 13, in ENG1 (-.188)
Ponting, 5, in AUS2 (-.178)
Honourable mention has to go to Cook, 0, in ENG1, which was worth -.176.
It's worth noting that for wickets or stands to count, they really need to come in pairs. It's no good piling on 100 runs and follow it with a pittance. Nor is taking a top batsman's wicket for a low score worth much if you don't break up the next partnership pretty quickly. You can let the wicket after that go for a bit, though. Anapestic metre, if you're of a poetic mind.
Are you surprised that the massive Clarke-North stand in the Australian second innings didn't appear? Probably not, as it was too late in the match to affect anything other than their averages. It actually did produce a positive effect, but I just wonder if the Australians should have cut it short when it was around a hundred and gone for a win. You never know.
Wednesday, 22 July 2009
Johnson: Rest or Play?
Mitchell Johnson's form seems to be causing some concern in Australia. Even CricInfo bloggers compare him unfavourably with Stuart Broad, which is pretty damning considering one is an opening bowler and the other a 'change' bowler. One of my many theories is that, to paraphrase a baseball expression, There Is No Such Thing As a Reliable Bowler (TINSTARB). Here are some interesting figures to ponder.
Notice that the more overs Johnson bowls, how his economy in each series goes up. He also saw his economy start high in the first series of the Southern Hemispher season. I think a combination of these factors is involved here. He's bowled, in Tests alone, over 900 overs in the past two years. This number is probably about the norm for the typical pace bowler at Test level; but since I think bowlers' workloads are too high, for the moment this is a datapoint in my argument.
On the other hand, he also does worse away from home. He wouldn't be the first cricketer in the world who thrived on home cooking. (See Trescothick, Marcus.)
Give Johnson a Test match off, then bring him back. If he still underperforms his average, and there's a better option, play the better option.
Cumulative
Series Overs Economy
07/08 Aus vs SrL 82 2.94
07/08 Aus vs Ind 250.1 3.15
07/08 WIn vs Aus 355 3.31
Three months off
08/09 Ind vs Aus 166 3.14
08/09 Aus vs NZl 231.4 2.35
08/09 Aus vs RSA 391.2 2.76
08/09 RSA vs Aus 530.2 2.88
Three months off
09 Aus vs Eng 82.4 4.00
Notice that the more overs Johnson bowls, how his economy in each series goes up. He also saw his economy start high in the first series of the Southern Hemispher season. I think a combination of these factors is involved here. He's bowled, in Tests alone, over 900 overs in the past two years. This number is probably about the norm for the typical pace bowler at Test level; but since I think bowlers' workloads are too high, for the moment this is a datapoint in my argument.
On the other hand, he also does worse away from home. He wouldn't be the first cricketer in the world who thrived on home cooking. (See Trescothick, Marcus.)
Give Johnson a Test match off, then bring him back. If he still underperforms his average, and there's a better option, play the better option.
Monday, 20 July 2009
The Bump in the Road
'Records are made to be broken.'
No-one has chased down 522, but every patriotic Englishman or Englishwoman must have gone to bed tonight with that saying at the back of his or her mind. Might I draw your attention to this test? Or, more worryingly, this one? Yes, those teams didn't chase down 522 runs, but they did go into their final innings with challenging targets. The only big difference is they achieved their victories at home.
Clarke and Haddin have actually shifted momentum towards Australia in a decisive way. England are looking like they are on the ropes now, if you ask me. In fact, calculating Australia's chances of victory suggests to me that they are above 50 per cent. I don't believe it, myself. (Sometimes, the numbers lie.) I think we'll see a draw. Tommorrow will see whether I should trust the numbers.
If they do pull it out, expect to see more articles like this one. I have a bone to pick with it, where Mr de Lisle writes:
Good, I say. The issue is whether it's more important to win matches or to avoid losing them. In my italianate way, I lean toward the latter. Don't give away wickets with a long tail of feeble batsmen, especially against a strong batting side like the Australians. West Indies show you the flaw in that strategy. It's more important to bat as deeply as you can. I'd even argue that Australia's difficulties arise out of taking that advice to the extreme. They almost certainly need another bowler. Three seamers and a spinner are not enough, unless two of those are all-time greats like McGrath and Warne. You need five bowlers, although one of them can just be a 'change' bowler who keeps the runs down and gives the attacking bowlers a rest. But perhaps that's better discussed another time.
No-one has chased down 522, but every patriotic Englishman or Englishwoman must have gone to bed tonight with that saying at the back of his or her mind. Might I draw your attention to this test? Or, more worryingly, this one? Yes, those teams didn't chase down 522 runs, but they did go into their final innings with challenging targets. The only big difference is they achieved their victories at home.
Clarke and Haddin have actually shifted momentum towards Australia in a decisive way. England are looking like they are on the ropes now, if you ask me. In fact, calculating Australia's chances of victory suggests to me that they are above 50 per cent. I don't believe it, myself. (Sometimes, the numbers lie.) I think we'll see a draw. Tommorrow will see whether I should trust the numbers.
If they do pull it out, expect to see more articles like this one. I have a bone to pick with it, where Mr de Lisle writes:
In fact [the bowlers] batted better than most of the batsmen.
Good, I say. The issue is whether it's more important to win matches or to avoid losing them. In my italianate way, I lean toward the latter. Don't give away wickets with a long tail of feeble batsmen, especially against a strong batting side like the Australians. West Indies show you the flaw in that strategy. It's more important to bat as deeply as you can. I'd even argue that Australia's difficulties arise out of taking that advice to the extreme. They almost certainly need another bowler. Three seamers and a spinner are not enough, unless two of those are all-time greats like McGrath and Warne. You need five bowlers, although one of them can just be a 'change' bowler who keeps the runs down and gives the attacking bowlers a rest. But perhaps that's better discussed another time.
Saturday, 18 July 2009
Lord's Nelsons
111 was bad news for the Australians today.
I've been playing around with a slightly modified version of the Runs/Wickets state ideas I'd mentioned earlier this year. I'm moving in the direction of 'Win Expectancy', although to do it properly, one needs to use a Markov chain I think.
Here are my calculations of the chances of an Australian victory after the fall of each Australian wicket:
Opening of Australian innings: 11.2 per cent
Hughes +8.6
Ponting +2.5
Katich no change
Hussey -9.3
Clarke -2.6
North +4.6
Johnson +1.2
Haddin -2.2
This data might indicate something I've been thinking about for a while, which is that the openers' wickets aren't as important as may be thought. Any runs they score helps their team's cause. The crucial point in the match is the battle for the 3rd and 4th wickets. If these fall cheaply, in quick succession, that shifts the advantage toward the bowling side quite strongly.
In today's play Katich's and Hussey's stand didn't help out very much, because after Hughes and Ponting were out for low scores, it was vital for the third-wicket partnership to make up the difference. They didn't, and to dismiss Hussey for only eight more runs after Katich was caught by Broad put the Australians in a very difficult situation.
Of course, each wicket only affects the match a small amount, so one shouldn't put too much weight on the third and fourth wickets. It's not hard to recover lost ground with a fifty partnership for the sixth or seventh wicket. That's the beauty of Test cricket, that it's so finely balanced at any given moment.
I've been playing around with a slightly modified version of the Runs/Wickets state ideas I'd mentioned earlier this year. I'm moving in the direction of 'Win Expectancy', although to do it properly, one needs to use a Markov chain I think.
Here are my calculations of the chances of an Australian victory after the fall of each Australian wicket:
Opening of Australian innings: 11.2 per cent
Hughes +8.6
Ponting +2.5
Katich no change
Hussey -9.3
Clarke -2.6
North +4.6
Johnson +1.2
Haddin -2.2
This data might indicate something I've been thinking about for a while, which is that the openers' wickets aren't as important as may be thought. Any runs they score helps their team's cause. The crucial point in the match is the battle for the 3rd and 4th wickets. If these fall cheaply, in quick succession, that shifts the advantage toward the bowling side quite strongly.
In today's play Katich's and Hussey's stand didn't help out very much, because after Hughes and Ponting were out for low scores, it was vital for the third-wicket partnership to make up the difference. They didn't, and to dismiss Hussey for only eight more runs after Katich was caught by Broad put the Australians in a very difficult situation.
Of course, each wicket only affects the match a small amount, so one shouldn't put too much weight on the third and fourth wickets. It's not hard to recover lost ground with a fifty partnership for the sixth or seventh wicket. That's the beauty of Test cricket, that it's so finely balanced at any given moment.
Sunday, 12 July 2009
Something in the Air
Here's a query for Statsguru at Cricinfo.com: how many times has a team given up six hundred runs in a match's second innings and drawn the match? The answer is eight.
The interesting point is that three of those draws have occurred this year, and two of those matches involved England.
During the first day, I commented to my erstwhile associate Mr Austin, that it seemed as if England had finally figured out something I learned almost as soon as I started using sabermetric methods to look at cricket: to build a winning team, first build a platform to avoid defeat. Or, in other words, make sure your tail is not full of cheap wickets, even if your attack suffers.
I just wonder if this reflects the Strauss-Flower combination. It's not the sort of attitude the Hussain-Fletcher era would have endorsed. They played to win, on Australia's terms; and never did against Australia. Let's see how things develop in this series.
The interesting point is that three of those draws have occurred this year, and two of those matches involved England.
During the first day, I commented to my erstwhile associate Mr Austin, that it seemed as if England had finally figured out something I learned almost as soon as I started using sabermetric methods to look at cricket: to build a winning team, first build a platform to avoid defeat. Or, in other words, make sure your tail is not full of cheap wickets, even if your attack suffers.
I just wonder if this reflects the Strauss-Flower combination. It's not the sort of attitude the Hussain-Fletcher era would have endorsed. They played to win, on Australia's terms; and never did against Australia. Let's see how things develop in this series.
Tuesday, 24 March 2009
Runs/Wickets State 3
As stated in the last post, the problem with looking at a single innings in isolation is that it does not take into account the match situation. Mitchell Johnson may have been improving Australia's chances of winning the match, but did they have much chance to begin with? For that, we need to look briefly at South Africa's second innings.
When the ninth wicket fell, the chances of South Africa winning, based on previous results were about.667—that is, two-thirds of all matches where the team batting in the second innings stood at 637/9 ended up with that team winning. However, there had been no matches that had seen the second innings finish on 651. Thus, at that point, we go with the available data, and wait on the outcome.
When the fifth Australian wicket fell, their chances of winning were .288-.667=-.379. When the tenth Australian wicket fell, we learned that the 422 score in the second innings results in defeat 2 out of 3 times. Australia's chances of winning were .333. South Africa's chances of winning on 651 go up to 1.000. They are the only team to reach that score at the end of the second innings of a match. However, the net effect of Hilfenhaus losing his wicket took Australia from -.271 chance of success to -.667, or a swing of -.396. But it would be unfair to pin all that blame on him. We need to share it out among all eleven players. Cricket is a collective effort, Mitchell Johnson gets the same blame for falling short as Hilfenhaus. Everyone gets a reduction in their score of -.032. The table produced yesterday now looks like this:
Johnson +.109-.032=+.077
McDonald +.101-.032=+.069
McGain +.014-.032=-.018
Siddle -.007-.032=-.039
Hilfenhaus -.032
Just because Hilfenhaus' was the last wicket to fall doesn't mean he deserves all the blame. Siddle's wicket was actually more significant in leading to a defeat. McGain's performance goes from being a positive to a negative.
One could argue that we need to adjust South Africa's score for Australia's first innings. I'm not sure. We'll take a look at that another time.
When the ninth wicket fell, the chances of South Africa winning, based on previous results were about.667—that is, two-thirds of all matches where the team batting in the second innings stood at 637/9 ended up with that team winning. However, there had been no matches that had seen the second innings finish on 651. Thus, at that point, we go with the available data, and wait on the outcome.
When the fifth Australian wicket fell, their chances of winning were .288-.667=-.379. When the tenth Australian wicket fell, we learned that the 422 score in the second innings results in defeat 2 out of 3 times. Australia's chances of winning were .333. South Africa's chances of winning on 651 go up to 1.000. They are the only team to reach that score at the end of the second innings of a match. However, the net effect of Hilfenhaus losing his wicket took Australia from -.271 chance of success to -.667, or a swing of -.396. But it would be unfair to pin all that blame on him. We need to share it out among all eleven players. Cricket is a collective effort, Mitchell Johnson gets the same blame for falling short as Hilfenhaus. Everyone gets a reduction in their score of -.032. The table produced yesterday now looks like this:
Johnson +.109-.032=+.077
McDonald +.101-.032=+.069
McGain +.014-.032=-.018
Siddle -.007-.032=-.039
Hilfenhaus -.032
Just because Hilfenhaus' was the last wicket to fall doesn't mean he deserves all the blame. Siddle's wicket was actually more significant in leading to a defeat. McGain's performance goes from being a positive to a negative.
One could argue that we need to adjust South Africa's score for Australia's first innings. I'm not sure. We'll take a look at that another time.
Sunday, 22 March 2009
Runs/Wickets State 2
So, now the match is finished, let's take another look at how we can use the Runs/Wickets State to measure a player's contribution.
When Mitchel Johnson came in, the runs/wickets state was 218/6. Teams at 218/6 had gone on to win .294 of their Test matches.
Johnson and McDonald took the score to 381/7. Teams at 381/7 went on to win .389 of their Test matches. Thus, Johnson and McDonald in this wicket managed to increase Australia's chances of victory by .095.
Siddle was out next ball, but at 381/8 we're looking at .382 wins, so Johnson's score stays the same but Siddle gets a -.007. (We'll punish the player whose wicket falls with any negative, and share the credit for any positive.)
Johnson and McGain put on 7 runs, so at 388/9 we're looking at .396 wins. Johnson's score goes up to .109, McGain gets credit for .014.
Johnson and Hilfenhaus take the score to 422. But defeat in this match transforms a score of 422 in the third innings of the match from a .500 win to a .333 win. That's a big -.063 for Hilfenhaus? Or is it a plus .104 for both?
Ah, you see, you can't just use a single innings' score. You have to remember that in the third innings of a match a team is chasing a pre-existing state.
Anyway, for the purpose of this post, let's call the scores as follows:
Johnson +.109
McDonald +.101
McGain +.014
Siddle -.007
Hilfenhaus -.063
When Mitchel Johnson came in, the runs/wickets state was 218/6. Teams at 218/6 had gone on to win .294 of their Test matches.
Johnson and McDonald took the score to 381/7. Teams at 381/7 went on to win .389 of their Test matches. Thus, Johnson and McDonald in this wicket managed to increase Australia's chances of victory by .095.
Siddle was out next ball, but at 381/8 we're looking at .382 wins, so Johnson's score stays the same but Siddle gets a -.007. (We'll punish the player whose wicket falls with any negative, and share the credit for any positive.)
Johnson and McGain put on 7 runs, so at 388/9 we're looking at .396 wins. Johnson's score goes up to .109, McGain gets credit for .014.
Johnson and Hilfenhaus take the score to 422. But defeat in this match transforms a score of 422 in the third innings of the match from a .500 win to a .333 win. That's a big -.063 for Hilfenhaus? Or is it a plus .104 for both?
Ah, you see, you can't just use a single innings' score. You have to remember that in the third innings of a match a team is chasing a pre-existing state.
Anyway, for the purpose of this post, let's call the scores as follows:
Johnson +.109
McDonald +.101
McGain +.014
Siddle -.007
Hilfenhaus -.063
Runs/Wickets State
Following on from yesterday's post, about Base/Out States in baseball, I thought I'd take a snapshot of the current Test Match, which will perhaps explain more plainly the direction that I'm going in.
When I checked the South Africa v Australia score, at tea Australia were 231/6. Teams at 231/6 in the third innings of the match have a cumulative record of 243 wins, 330 losses and 235 draws. That's a success rate of .301, which tells you that, even not knowing South Africa scored 651 runs, that Australia weren't in good shape to win the match.
At 365/6, the current score, the success rate is .383, still not good, but better, an improvement of .082. Thus, we can calculate that this current stand by McDonald and Johnson has increased the Australian chances of success.
When I checked the South Africa v Australia score, at tea Australia were 231/6. Teams at 231/6 in the third innings of the match have a cumulative record of 243 wins, 330 losses and 235 draws. That's a success rate of .301, which tells you that, even not knowing South Africa scored 651 runs, that Australia weren't in good shape to win the match.
At 365/6, the current score, the success rate is .383, still not good, but better, an improvement of .082. Thus, we can calculate that this current stand by McDonald and Johnson has increased the Australian chances of success.
Wednesday, 28 January 2009
Bat or Ball?
My Level 1 Series Scores are calculated 'out of context'. Level 2 scores attempt to adjust the values of wickets taken and runs scored according to the average standard of the series. Level 1 scores have an element of adjustment, but only to runs scored. Thus, the ratio of total points allocated to runs scored will offer some indication of whether a series was dominated by the batsmen or the bowlers. A high ratio of runs scored means the batting was dominant, a lower one the bowling.
Here are the ratios for the 'Christmas Tests', which I have been analysing over the last week or so:
I'm surprised that the New Zealand series with West Indies was more 'bat' than the Australia vs South Africa showdown.
Here are the ratios for the 'Christmas Tests', which I have been analysing over the last week or so:
Ban v SrL 1.22
NZl v WIn 1.18
Aus v RSA 1.16
I'm surprised that the New Zealand series with West Indies was more 'bat' than the Australia vs South Africa showdown.
Monday, 19 January 2009
Australia vs South Africa Tests Reviewed: Bowling
I'll start with the Series Scores for the bowlers, then I'll supply the analysis.
Overall, Australia had an economy of 2.84 for the series. That's very good. Unfortunately, they had strike rate of 90.05. That's exceedingly poor. One of my benchmark series for poor performance is West Indies' tour of Australia in 2005/6. West Indies' strike rate of 86.27 left them hopelessly outclassed. That Australia managed to stay in this series at all is a testament to their batting strength. You don't win Tests by holding the runs down; you win them by taking wickets.
That's why Steyn is at the top of this list. He was expensive, with an economy of 3.59 (which wouldn't win a team many Test series) but a strike rate of 43.78. He carried the South African bowling attack almost single-handed. He was the Man of the Series by any estimation, and won it for the Proteas. If he can't repeat his magic on Australia's return tour, I can't see how the South Africans can win. Overall, their strike rate didn't even get past the notional minimum needed for a series victory of 65. They finished on 66.41. As the first-level Series' Scores show, this series was dominated by the batsmen.
While South Africa can carry Steyn around on their shoulders, Australians will be pushing Brett Lee and Jason Krejza into the dunce's corner. Between them they probably cost Australia the series. Those are horrific scores for men bowling 120 overs between them. (That's 20 an innings over three tests - the equivalent of one front-line bowler at -48.) While the Australians probably could have survived the poor batting of Hayden and Hussey (the latter of whom actually helped out with the ball), there was just nowhere to hide Lee and Krejza (plus Clarke, who goes from 28 with the bat to 18 overall, thanks to some dreadful bowling).
Let's conclude by putting Australia's chances in perspective. In the entire history of Test cricket, how many times do you think a team with a stingy economy of 2.84, but a bowling average of between 42.06 and 43.05 (indicating a lack of penetration), has won a Test match? There have been 42 matches involving such a team.
Try once.
Steyn (RSA) 30
Johnson (Aus) 29
Siddle (Aus) 20
McDonald (Aus) 6
Duminy (RSA) 3
Hussey (Aus) 2
Harris (RSA) 1
Kallis (RSA) 1
Symonds (Aus) - 3
Morkel (RSA) - 4
Hauritz (Aus) - 7
Bollinger (Aus) - 7
Clarke (Aus) - 10
Ntini (RSA) - 12
Krejza (Aus) - 21
Lee (Aus) - 27
Overall, Australia had an economy of 2.84 for the series. That's very good. Unfortunately, they had strike rate of 90.05. That's exceedingly poor. One of my benchmark series for poor performance is West Indies' tour of Australia in 2005/6. West Indies' strike rate of 86.27 left them hopelessly outclassed. That Australia managed to stay in this series at all is a testament to their batting strength. You don't win Tests by holding the runs down; you win them by taking wickets.
That's why Steyn is at the top of this list. He was expensive, with an economy of 3.59 (which wouldn't win a team many Test series) but a strike rate of 43.78. He carried the South African bowling attack almost single-handed. He was the Man of the Series by any estimation, and won it for the Proteas. If he can't repeat his magic on Australia's return tour, I can't see how the South Africans can win. Overall, their strike rate didn't even get past the notional minimum needed for a series victory of 65. They finished on 66.41. As the first-level Series' Scores show, this series was dominated by the batsmen.
While South Africa can carry Steyn around on their shoulders, Australians will be pushing Brett Lee and Jason Krejza into the dunce's corner. Between them they probably cost Australia the series. Those are horrific scores for men bowling 120 overs between them. (That's 20 an innings over three tests - the equivalent of one front-line bowler at -48.) While the Australians probably could have survived the poor batting of Hayden and Hussey (the latter of whom actually helped out with the ball), there was just nowhere to hide Lee and Krejza (plus Clarke, who goes from 28 with the bat to 18 overall, thanks to some dreadful bowling).
Let's conclude by putting Australia's chances in perspective. In the entire history of Test cricket, how many times do you think a team with a stingy economy of 2.84, but a bowling average of between 42.06 and 43.05 (indicating a lack of penetration), has won a Test match? There have been 42 matches involving such a team.
Try once.
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